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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
D E N N I S R. COBURN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
G I V A N F O R D S A L E S , INC.
Defendant and Appellant,

Case No.
13,353

and
C R A I G D. K E M P T O N ,
Defendant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E N A T U R E OF
T H E CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property
damages arising out of a traffic accident in Provo, Utah,
in which Respondent, Dennis R. Coburn, claimed the
negligence of defendant, Craig D. Kempton, was the
cause of his injuries and that Appellant, Givan Ford
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Sales, Inc., was also liable therefor for the reason that
Kempton was their employee, was driving a vehicle
owned by them and was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen in the District Court in and for Utah
County, resulting in a unanimous jury verdict and consequent judgment for special damages, general damages
and costs, totaling $22,340.22. Judgment was entered
against both Craig D. Kempton and Givan Ford Sales,
Inc., in that amount. After the trial, Appellant, Givan
Ford Sales, Inc., made motions for dismissal, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial,
which were denied, and now Givan appeals.
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Respondent requests that the jury verdict and judgment entered thereon be affirmed.

S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS
Respondent controverts and supplements Appellant's Statement of Facts as follows:
On December 4, 1970, Respondent, Dennis R.
Coburn, a young married man and recent college graduate, was making business calls on his new job as an
2
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insurance agent for Farm Bureau Insurance Company.
H e was traveling north on University Avenue in Provo
in his Volkswagen automobile crossing a viaduct which
carried the traffic over the railroad tracks. The weather
was rainy and cold, and as he approached the intersection at the bottom of the viaduct a green Alpine
Sunbeam sports car made a sudden "jack rabbit" start
from a side road which entered the intersection from
his right. Plaintiff was driving on a through street and
the sports car came out from a stop sign, failing to yield
the right-of-way. The sports car executed a left turn
resulting in almost a head-on collision between the two
vehicles. The driver of th Sunbeam Alpine sports car
had been having difficulty with the defrosting mechanism and his windows were entirely fogged except for
a small hole in the windshield which the driver had
cleared with his hand. The sports car was owned by
Givan Ford Sales, Inc., and driven by their employee,
Craig D. Kempton, who stated that he did not see the
Volkswagen automobile as he entered the intersection
just before impact.
Craig D. Kempton had worked for Givan Ford
Sales, Inc., for about six months prior to the time of
the accident (Tr. 43). H e punched a time clock each
day, working from 8:00 o'clock a.m. to 6:00 p.m., with
a usual work week of 44 hours (Tr. 44). Mr. Kempton
worked under the Sales Department, having been hired
by Ernie Earl, Givan Ford Sales Manager, who was
his immediate supervisor (Tr. 44, 45 and 116). H e was
also subject to supervision in his work to another sales3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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man, Mr. Denny Davis, and the owners, Mr. Larry
Givan and Mr. E d Givan (Tr. 216). Givan Ford Sales,
Inc., maintained a large lot of new and used cars which
occupied a large portion of a city block in Provo, fronting on both University Avenue and Second South
Street (Tr. 107). Craig Kempton's duties related to
the new as well as the used cars, including starting all
used cars every morning and all new cars every other
morning and seeing that all cars physically ran (Tr.
45 ,46). It was his responsibility to keep the cars clean,
washed, vacuumed, and oil levels filled up. H e had to
check and charge batteries, see to the repair and maintenance of tires by delivering them to a nearby service
station where the work would be done; and since it was
wintertime, he had a daily responsibility to install antifreeze in all cars whose antifreeze levels were insufficient for the weather conditions (Tr. 45, 47 and 49).
It was his general responsibility to see that all cars were
kept in sales condition and make sure they were "running pretty good." If any car would not start or had
a condition that needed repair that he could not handle
himself, he was to report it to Ernie Earl or get a
mechanic to have it repaired (Tr. 35, 48, 49, 106, 130
and 213).
Appellant had provided Mr. Kempton with his
own personal dealer's plate which he could place on
any of the new or used cars when he took them off the
lot (Tr. 47). H e took cars from the lot and used the
plate on a daily basis (Tr. 48). His daily duties required
him to run frequent errands in the community to get
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parts or other items for the company, and in doing so
he would always take one of the used cars from the lot
(Tr. 47 and 131). Because the car lot of Givan Ford
Sales, Inc. fronted on two streets and because Mr.
Kempton's duties required him to do so, he was always
moving cars somewhere, rearranging their location from
one part of the lot to the other, going on errands, and
otherwise driving cars on and off the lot (Tr. 107, 108
and 109).
Occasionally he was instructed to drive vehicles on
errands to Salt Lake City, Ogden and American Fork
(Tr. 109). Once in awhile Ernie Earl would instruct
him to take a specific used car because it hadn't been
out on the street for awhile in order to" loosen it up"
(Tf. 47).
There was a regular practice at Given Ford Sales,
Inc., for the salesmen to offer to pay Craig a "bird
dog" fee for any referrals he made of people who bought
a specific car. Although the company did not pay the
bird dog fees, the practice was common knowledge in
the company and had the company's tacit approval
(Tr. 105, 106, 107, 230, 231 and 232). Craig had two
or three friends who had come onto the lot and talked
to him prior to the accident about looking for a car
that might be used as a dune buggy. As he drove the
cars about, he was often looking them over to see if he
might be able to find a prospective buyer among his
acquaintances (Tr. 135 and 136).
Since it was winter, Mr. Kempton had a daily duty

5
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to check the antifreeze in the cars. This was particularly
true with regard to used cars which were newly arrived
on the lot, which would occur several times a day (Tr.
49). If antifreeze was needed, he would pull the car
off the lot into the street to drain the radiator into the
gutter and then he would place the antifreeze in the
cooling system. Craig usually pulled the car to be tested
off the lot, would drive it for a couple of blocks, and
then return back to the street, parking near the lot to
perform these services (Tr. 49, 107 and 132). Givan
Ford Sales, Inc., supplied Mr. Kempton with two
different antifreeze testers, one that required the engine
coolant to be warm when tested. When using that tester,
he would usually run the motor of the car until it was
warm and then run his test (Tr. 140).
On the day of the accident Mr. Kempton punched
in on the time clock at 7:58 o'clock a.m. (Tr. 143). H e
performed his usual duties that morning with regard to
starting and washing cars until a little after 11:00 o'clock
a.m. The Sunbeam Alpine, which he was driving at
the time of the accident, had newly arrived on the lot,
and he had not yet checked the antifreeze in it. His
intention was to take it off the lot, warm it up and return
to test the antifreeze (Tr. 125). As he drove it off the
lot, he testified that he decided to also try it out in order
that he could tell the salesmen of its running condition.
H e thought he might have some friends who might be
interested in buying it, and he thought he might look
at it himself to see if he might be interested in buying
it to be a dune buggy (Tr. 125, 136). H e drove the
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car three blocks to the intersection where the accident
occurred at about 11:20 o'clock a.m. After the accident,
he was so badly shaken up that he was told by his supervisor, Ernie Eari, that he ought to go home early and
he checked off his time card when he left work at 12:15
o'clock p.m. (Tr. 137 and 144). H e resumed his regular
work schedule the next day (Tr. 138).
Mr. Coburn sustained permanent injuries consisting of a scalping and facial laceration from the hairline
across the forehead, through the eyebrow, and across
the eyelid, a bone chip in the elbow, and a severe fracture of the talus bone in the left ankle, which permanently limited the motion and use of the ankle that
resulted in a lifetime of pain and a limp while walking. The medical experts estimated his loss of total
body function of from 7.5 percent to 15 percent.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS LIABILITY WAS SHOWN
BY
SUBSTANTIAL
COMPETENT
EVID E N C E TO W H I C H A P P E L L A N T M A D E NO
O B J E C T I O N , A N D NO E R R O R W A S COMM I T T E D I N D E N Y I N G A P P E L L A N T S OBJ E C T I O N S TO T H E O T H E R E V I D E N C E ON
LIABILITY.
Appellant's assertion that the cconly" evidence of
liability on the part of Givan Ford Sales, Inc., was
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incompetent and improperly admitted is not only erroneous, it flies in the face of the record. In making this
assertion, Appellant seems to be stating what he wishes
were true while choosing to neatly ignore the facts
that were put into evidence. Appellant says, in effect,
that had the trial court sustained Appellant's objections to certain evidence, the jury would have had no
evidence from which it could determine that Craig
Kempton was acting within the scope or course of his
employment at the time of the accident.
While it is true that in the course of the trial
counsel for Givan Ford made several objections to the
introduction of some of the evidence, it is assuredly
not true that the "only" evidence of liability of Givan
Ford was introduced over counsel's objections. A
review of the whole record will clearly demonstrate that
the jury had before it adequate, substantial and convincing evidence of the liability of Givan Ford other
than that which was challenged by objections of Givan
Ford's counsel.
The following summary describes some of the evidence that was introduced without challenge as to competency or propriety of its admission, and amply illustrates the error of Appellant's assertion:
l.At the time of the accident, Craig Kempton
had worked for Givan Ford for about six months
(Tr. 43).
2. H e worked about 44 hours a week, usually
from 8:00 o'clock a.m. to 6:00 o'clock p.m.,
and punched a time clock each day (Tr. 44).

8
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On the day of the accident he punched in at
7:58 a.m., and signed out about an hour after
the accident (Tr. 143).
3. H e was hired by Ernie Earl, Givan Ford's
Sales Manager, who became his immediate supervisor, and he worked under the Sales Department (Tr. 44, 45 and 116). H e was also subject
to supervision by the owners, Larry Givan and
E d Givan, and Denny Davis, a salesman (Tr.
216).
4. Givan Ford maintained a large lot of new
and used cars. Craig Kempton's duties included:
keeping them clean, washed, vacuumed, oil levels
up, checking batteries and tires, checking and
installing antifreeze, starting all used cars every
morning and all new cars every other morning,
and seeing that all cars physically ran. If they
would not start, he was to report it to Ernie
Earl or get a mechanic to have them repaired.
H e was generally to see that the cars were kept
in sales condition (Tr. 45, 48, 49, 106, 130 and
215).
5. His daily duties required him to run frequent
errands in the community to get parts or other
items for the company, and in doing so he would
always take one of the used cars from the lot
(Tr. 47 and 131).
6. Givan Ford provided Mr. Kempton with his
own personal dealer's plate which he could place
on any of the new or used cars when he took
them off the lot (Tr. 47). H e took cars from
the lot and used the plates daily (Tr. 48). Sometimes he took cars without using the dealer's
plate if he wasn't going far (Tr. 48).
7. The car lot fronted on two streets and Craig
was always moving cars somewhere, rearrang-
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ing their location from one part of the lot to the
other or going on errands (Tr. 107,108 and 109).
8. Occasionally he was sent on errands to Salt
Lake City, Ogden and American Fork (Tr.
109).
9. Sometimes Ernie Earl would tell him to take
a specific used car to loosen it up because it hadn't
been out on the street for awhile (Tr. 47).
10. When a tire was flat, he would take the car a
block away to Rowley's Texaco to have it repaired (Tr. 47).
11. There was a regular practice of Givan Ford
for their salesmen to offer to pay a "bird dog"
fee to Craig for referrals of people who bought
cars. This practice was common knowledge to
the company and to Ernie Earl, Craig's supervisor (Tr. 105, 106, 107, 230, 231 and 232).
12. Craig had two or three friends who had come
onto the lot and talked to him prior to the accident about looking for a car they might use to
make a dune buggy. One approached him right
after the accident in relation to seeing if he could
buy the car involved in the accident for that purpose (Tr. 135 and 136).
13. It was winter, and as used cars were brought
to the lot it was Craig's duty to check the antifreeze. This occurred several times a day. If
anitfreeze was needed, he would pull the car off
the lot into the street to drain the radiator and
put antifreeze in it. Craig would usually pull
the car to be tested off the lot, drive a couple of
blocks, make a U-turn and go back to the lot
(Tr. 49, 107 and 132).
14. Givan Ford supplied Craig with two different antifreeze testers. One required the engine
coolant to be warm when tested, and the other
could test while cold. When he used the tester
10
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that required it to be warm, he would run the
motor or else run the car until it was warm and
then run the test (Tr. 140).
15. The Sunbeam Alpine Craig was driving at
the time of the accident had just previously
arrived on the lot and Craig had not checked the
antifreeze in it. H e drove it off the lot to run it
before putting antifreeze in it. H e also wanted
to see how it ran. H e intended to drive the car
to the viaduct three blocks away, cross the viaduct, turn around and come back. H e drove
it the three blocks to the intersection at the base
of the viaduct where the accident occurred (Tr.
125, 133, 134 and 140).
16. The accident occurred at about 11:20 a.m.
When he finished with the police officer he went
back to Givan Ford where Ernie Earl told him
he ought to go home early because he looked
shaken up. He then wrote the time, 12:15 p.m.
on his time card and left work. H e resumed his
regular work schedule on the next day (Tr.
28, 29, 137, 139, 143 and 144).
Surely the foregoing evidence that came in without
objection amply demonstrates that the evidence that
Appellant objected to was not the "only" evidence on
the liability of Givan Ford.
Appellant next insists that the evidence at the
trail established that Craig Kempton was doing nothing
in furtherance of Givan Ford's business nor anything
reasonably incidental to his employment, and that therefore Givan Ford should be free from liability. The
record flatly contradicts such an assertion. In fact,
the record makes it clear that Mr. Kempton had at least
four purposes in driving the car that day:

11
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1. His primary purpose was to take it off the
lot and warm up the engine in order to test the
antifreeze.
2. In addition, he said he wanted to drive it in
order to be able to answer the inquiries he expected from salesmen on how it ran.
3. H e wanted to be able to check it over and see
if he thought one of his friends might want it
so he could get a "bird dog" fee from the sale.
4. H e further wanted to see if he might be interested in buying the car himself for a dune
buggy.
Clearly, all four purposes for the trip were in furtherance of the employer's business. Givan had the car for
sale and all four reasons for the trip related to its potential sale. Mr. Kempton was employed as part of
the staff of Givan Ford's Sales Department. H e was
furnished with his own dealer s plates. His direct supervisor was the Sales Manager, Mr. Ernie Earl, who
testified one of Mr. Kempton's duties was to check the
cars to be sure they were in sales condition. Warming
up the engine to test the antifreeze was one of his
specific and direct duties. I t was winter, the car had
just come onto the lot and he needed to get that done.
H e considered it to be part of his job to run the car
not only so he could do his work on it, but so he could
tell his supervisor or a mechanic if it needed work to
put it in sales condition, and also so he could tell the
salesmen about its condition. His driving only three
blocks to the intersection where the accident occurred
was consistent with his usual practice of driving a few
blocks before checking the antifreeze, and was clearly
in the scope of his employment.
12
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Checking the car to see if he might have a friend
who might want to buy it is clearly in furtherance of the
employer's purposes, and so, likewise, was checking it
to see if he may want to buy it. H e said he had already
bought one car off the lot. Neither of these additional
purposes cancelled or terminated his primary purpose
of getting the engine warm so he could check the antifreeze.
Appellant seems to insist that since Craig Kempton
may have had a personal reason for the trip as well as
furtherance of his employer's business, this, ipso facto,
takes him out of the scope of employment. Such is
clearly not the law.
I t is well settled that when the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer he
is within the scope of his employment. The American
Law Institute Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d,
Section 236, Conduct Actuated by Dual Purpose,
states this rule as follows:
" Conduct may be within the scope of employment, although done in part to serve the purpose
of the servant or of a third person."
Fuller v. Chambers, 377 P . 2d 848, Calif. 1959, states
at page 852:
" . . . where the servant is combining his own
business with that of his master, or attending
to both at substantially the same time, no nice
inquiry will be made as to which business the
servant was actually engaged in when a third
person was injured; but the master will be held
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responsible, unless it clearly appears that the
servant could not have been directly or indirectly
serving his master."
See also, Van Vranken v. Fence-Craft, 430 P . 2d 488,
Idaho, 1967. I t was stated in Carter v. Bessey, 97 Utah
427, 93 P. 2d 490:
"Whenever reasonable minds may differ as to
whether the servant was at a certain time involved wholly or partly in the performance of his
master's business, or within the scope of his
employment, the question is one for a jury."
(page 432)
and further:
"The question in every case is whether the act
he was doing was one in prosecution of his master's business and not whether it was done in
accordance with the master's instructions." (page
433)
Furthermore, it is clear that slight deviation from
instructions of the master for the employee's own
purposes does not take the servant out of the scope of
his employment. The case of Burton v. LaDuke, 61
Utah 78, 210 P . 978, involved such a question and this
court stated:
" . . . there was some substantial evidence in the
record not only tending to show that the defendant, had with knowledge, not only sent out
his employee, Pedigrew, upon the streets to
do his work with an auto truck dangerously defective in operation, but also tending
to show that as has been seen, defendant
had, at least on one previous occasion in the
furtherance of his cleaning business, sent
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Pedigrew far beyond the district in which it was
claimed his duties were to be performed. That
being true, it was for the jury, under proper
instruction given by the court, to find as a fact
from all the evidence, and not for the court to
determine as a matter of law, whether or not the
defendant's servant had exceeded his authority,
and was not acting within the scope of his employment nor in the furtherance of his master's
business at the time when and the place where
the accident complained of occurred." (page 83)
After citing numerous cases in support of the
proposition that mere deviation from his duty by an
employee does not exempt his employer from liability
for his negligence in the event of accident, the court
further stated:
"We have tried to show that, ordinarily, in cases
of this kind, the question of whether or not the
wrong complained fo was committed within
the scope of the servant's employment is one
primarily to be determined by the jury from
the evidence in the particular case, more especially where there is doubt or conflicting evidence
as to the authority conferred upon the servant
byt he master and the scope of his employment."
(pages 85 and 86)
The basic thrust of Point I of Appellant's brief
directs itself to a claim that it was error for the trial
court to allow use of the deposition of Craig Kempton
at the trial. Appellant avers that Craig Kempton was
not really adverse to plaintiff on the issue of the scope
of his employment, and therefore the answers he gave at
his deposition could not properly be used for any pur15
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pose at the trial. Appellant appears to hope that because
this court has available to it only the cold words of the
record, it may not discern that Mr. Kempton was not
only an adverse party to plaintiff in the proceeding,
but he was uncooperative and clearly a hostile witness
as the Respondent's council examined him and sought
to impeach him by reference to his answers given at
the deposition that contradicted some of his testimony
at the trial. Though in a situation such as the instant
one, the Respondent's tendency is to wish the court had
available to it a sound track movie of the trial from
which to view Mr. Kempton's hostile demeanor and
attitude, this court has often observed that it gives
deference to the advantaged position of the trial judge
in that regard. Nevertheless, a review of the record
will give some insight as to the circumstances in this
case.
Respondent specifically called Craig Kempton to
testify as an "adverse witness" without objection by
appellant (Tr. 42 and 118), As Mr. Kempton answered
Respondent's questions, he was often evasive and
ducked his head, mumbling uncooperative and almost
inaudible answers. H e had to be repeatedly cautioned
to speak up (Tr. 43 and 46). As counsel for Respondent observed in discussion with the trial court, Mr.
Kempton clearly demonstrated by his courtroom demeanor that he considered himself to be adverse and
hostile to the Respondent (Tr. 118). The trial court
even specifically ruled that he was a "hostile" witness
(Tr. 126).
16
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An examination of the record will show that as
counsel for Respondent was asking Mr. Kempton to
describe his duties with relation to the used cars, Appellant was making objections designed to prevent
Mr. Kempton from testifying that one of his responsibilities was to check the cars in order to keep them
running well. Counsel for Appellant first tried to
interpose an objection in such a way as to tell the
witness he did not want him to say it was his job to
keep the cars running:
"Q. MR. J E F F S : Now you had some responsibility then to keep them running, is that it?
A. Yes.
MR. C L E G G : I am going to object to that. I
believe he testified he was to start them, but not
keep them running. That is a mechanic's job.
T H E C O U R T : You can cross-examine him and
develop that, can't you?
MR. C L E G G : Perhaps I can, your Honor. I
think we are going . . . " (Tr. 45, lines 15 to 24)
H e next objected that counsel for Respondent should
not be allowed to lead this adverse witness on questions
relating to scope of his employment (Tr. 45, 46 and
49). Finally he sought and received permission from
the court to Voir Dire the witness on that question
(Tr. 50). The consequences of Mr. Kempton's answers
to Appellant's questions in that Voir Dire examination was to give the jury the impression that it was
not one of Mr. Kempton's duties to see that the cars
were running. This was in direct conflict with testi-
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mony he had previously given in his deposition. The
situation was ripe for impeachment. Counsel for Respondent, after Appellant's Voir Dire examination,
asked Mr. Kempton if he had not testified in his deposition that it was his responsibility to see if the cars
were in good running condition and report whether
they were or not (Tr. 15, line 10). It is interesting to
note it was then counsel for Appellant who first requested, "Could we have the deposition?" (Tr. 51, line
15), even though, now, on appeal he complains that it
was error to allow the use of the deposition. In any event,
the deposition was published without objection from
Appellant, and the following colloquy took place:
"Q. MR. J E F F S : Now if you will follow me on
page 31, I asked you which salesman asked
you about the condition of the specific cars on
the lot, and you answered: 'All of them would.
If I was around there they would yell, 'What
kind of shape is this car in?' I would say, you
know, I would tell them pretty well. Dennie
liked to know just exactly. H e didn't like to
take the customer. H e would say, 'Does this car
run good? Does it eat oil or do this?' and I would
tell him.'
Q. Now, was that your answer at that time?
A. Close enough, yes.
Q. Now . . .
T H E C O U R T : Mr. Jeffs, I believe the Bailiff
left a note for you.
MR. J E F F S : Your honor, I have had a message
that Doctor Robertson is here, and pursuant to
18
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the stipulation that we entered into, I would
therefore request we interrupt the testimony of
this witness and resume it after we have Doctor
Robertson testify.
T H E C O U R T : Step down."
The use of the deposition for impeachment was
thus interrupted before its completion as Mr. Kempton
left the stand. After several hours of medical testimony
by two doctors was completed, Mr. Kempton again
resumed the stand and testified about his activities in
connection with his work (Tr. 104 to 116). The deposition was not used in connection with that testimony.
Then, as the examination returned to the issue of his
duties, raised earlier by Appellant's Voir Dire examination, the testimony was again interrupted when
counsel for Respondent asked:
"Q. Okay. Now with regard to the other use of
the cars, with regard to their working condition,
the use of the cars I take it then that you made
was also to find out how they were running, is
that right?
MR. C L E G G : Objection." (Tr. 109 and 110)
A harangue between counsel ensued that continued
until time for the court to recess for the day (Tr. 110
to 115).
The following day Mr. Kempton resumed the
stand and counsel for Respondent resumed the use of
the deposition and impeachment process that had begun
before the interruptions of the day before (Tr. 116).
Council for Appellant objected that it appeared to be
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an attempt at impeachment when to his view the witness was not in a position for impeachment. Giving
counsel for Appellant the benefit of the doubt, he had
apparently forgotten that the use of the deposition
for impeachment of the previous day had been interrupted and did not recognize this as a resumption of
that questioning process (Tr. 117). After another
extended debate between counsel on the question of the
use of the deposition, the court allowed Respondent's
counsel to read to the witness two more of his answers
from the deposition in which he had stated it was his
duty to keep the cars running and to ask if he had not
in fact made those statements.
Not only does Appellant erroneously assert that
the deposition was not used for impeachment, but he
would have this court believe that counsel for Respondent had been unable to adduce direct testimony that
Mr. Kempton was acting in the scope of his employment and so he resorted to reading into the record
extensively from Mr. Kempton's deposition to superimpose it on the direct testimony. Such an assertion
is simply not true.
W e have already set forth herein some of that direct
testimony Appellant hopes to ignore, but even more,
the record shows the total use of the deposition was as
follows: (Tr. 52, line 29 to 53, line 10)
"Q. MR. J E F F S : Now if you will follow me
on page 31, I asked you which salesman asked
you about the condition of the specific cars on
the lot, and you answered 'All of them would. If
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I was around there they would say, they would
have a customer and they would yell, 'What
kind of shape is this car in?' I would say, you
know, i would tell them pretty well. Dennie liked
to know just exactly. H e didn't like to take
the customer. H e would say, 'Does this car run
good? Does it eat oil or do this?' And I would
tell him.'
Q. Now was that your answer at that time?
A. Close enough, yes."
Tr. 122, line 22 to 123, line 6:
"Q. MR. J E F F S : Now, Mr. Kempton, we
were talking about what Ernie Earl told you
your responsibilities were, and in your deposition you said: 'All he told me was that I was
supposed to keep the cars running pretty good
and then he just gave me a few things to do.
H e said, 'We will keep you busy. You come
and ask me what to do, and I will keep you going for a few days, and from then on you are
on your own.' H e said, 'You will know what
to do by then.' "
Now that was your statement, was it not?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Okay. Then I asked you to describe for me
what your duties were during the course of your
employment, and if you will go to page 4, please,
on line 9, you answered: 'Well, all I was—' "
Counsel for Appellant interrupted with an objection and after the court ruled, the questioned continued
(Tr. 123, line 17 to 29):
"Q. MR. J E F F S : You answered, Mr. Kempton : 'Well, all I was ever told was to keep cars
21
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washed and cleaned and make sure all of them
were running good, and check the antifreeze and
the oil, and just general keeping them in sales
condition.'
T H E C O U R T : Hasn't he already said that
yesterday, Mr. Jeffs?
MR. J E F F S :
Honor.

If he did, I apologize, Your

T H E COURT: Go ahead. Ask the question.
Q. MR. J E F F S : That's what you were to do in
connection with your work, is that right?
A. That is right."
Therefore, as the foregoing review of the record
illustrates, although there were several protracted arguments to the court relative to use of the deposition
(most of which took place out of the hearing of the
jury), the actual use of the deposition before the jury
was limited to reading three brief answers of the witness
and to query him as to their truthfulness. All three
contradicted the statements he had made during Appellant's Voir Dire examination to the effect that he had
no duties to check the cars to keep them running.
Appellant's brief seeks to dispose of the facts
disclosed in the record by the mere statement that "the
questions were not cast to impeach," choosing to ignore
the fact that the deposition really was used for impeachment. Counsel for Respondent so stated at the time
it was done (Tr. 119) and in fact it was used to show
that the three answers the witness gave in his deposition
22
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contradicted the witnesses's testimony given during
counsel for Appellant's Voir Dire examination.
Rule 32 (a) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
"(1) Any deposition may be used by any party
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching
the testimony of deponent as a witness . . . "
And, Rule 43(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides as follows:
"(b) Scope of Examination cmd Cross-Eocamination. A party may interrogate any unwilling
or hostile witness by leading questions. A party
may call an adverse party . . . and interrogate
him by leading questions without being bound
by his testimony and may contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party . . . "
But even if the deposition had not been used for
impeachment, Rule 32 (a) (2), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure would apply. It reads as follows:
"The deposition of a party . . . may be used by
an adverse party for any purpose."
Appellant insists this court must construe the
latter Rule so as to limit its application to parties adverse on the issue developed. Appellant insists that Mr.
Kempton was not adverse to plaintiff on the question
of liability of his employer, Givan Ford, and therefore,
the trial court should not have allowed any of the deposition to be read. Appellant's reasoning in that regard
seems rather elusive since the facts at trial demonstrate
23
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that Mr. Kempton was clearly the adversary against
whom plaintiff was seeking and did receive a judgment on each of the issues alleged in the complaint, and
since the employer's liability would necessarily be
derivative arising only out of a finding of liability on
the part of Mr. Kempton. In the court's instruction
No. 12, the jury was specifically directed that if they
did not find Craig Kempton to be liable to plaintiff,
it would be unnecessary for them to consider the issue
of his agency for Givan Ford, since Given Ford would
not be liable. The suggestion that the interest of Mr.
Kempton on the issue of the liability of his employer
somehow crosses over in the lawsuit and becomes the
same as the interest of the plaintiff is tantamount to
saying that Mr. Kempton would somehow benefit from
helping plaintiff prove the liability of his employer.
Of course this is not true. Mr. Kempton could not be
relieved from liability or in fact be benefitted in any
way by helping plaintiff prove the liability of Givan
Ford. His demeanor in the course of the trial, including
uncooperative answers to the questions posed by Respondent's counsel and his hostile manner amply demonstrate the error of appellant's position as related to
this defendant.
Even if the record did not demonstrate Appellant's
error on this point, careful examination of the authorities
cited by Appellant in support of his theory will do so.
Appellant cites as authority for that proposition,
a comment relating to Rule 32(a), Federal Rules of
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Civil Procedure, found in Volume I V A, Moore, Federal Practice (2d E d ) , 32-16 and 32-17, which reads
as follows:
" . . . The deposition of a party may be used
for any purpose only by an adverse party; and
the deposition of a party may not be used by
anyone other than an adverse party for any purpose except impeachment of the testimony of
the deponent as a witness as provided in Rule
32(a) (1), unless the court finds the existence
of one of the conditions enumerated in Rule 32
( a ) ( 3 ) . 'Adverse party' as used in this Rule
is a term of art, and means a party whose interest
in the case is adverse to that of another party,
even though they may be both nominally aligned
as co-parties. Thus, where a defendant has served
an answer upon a co-defendant which states a
cross-claim against him, they are adverse parties
as to the cross-claim, even though nominally they
are co-defendants."
Appellant's brief conveniently leaves out that
explanatory last sentence. Nevertheless, even a very
strained construction of the language quoted by Appellant could not result in the conclusion that where a
plaintiff is seeking a judgment against a defendant,
that defendant's interest could somehow cross over in
the lawsuit and become synonymous with that of the
plaintiff so as to prevent use of his deposition at trial.
I t seems obvious that the author's intention is to say
that as to co-parties (that is those nominally named
on the same side of the lawsuit) there should be a
determination of adverse interest before such a party's
deposition could be used by the other co-party under
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Rule 3 2 ( a ) ( 2 ) . Furthermore, if Appellant's reasoning were followed, the burden of the trial judge would
be greatly increased by placing upon him the responsibility of determining in the course of the trial, the
shades or degrees of interest a party may have as to
every issue and every party in the lawsuit.
Appellant cites several cases as authority for his
claim that the trial court should have determined that
Craig Kempton was not adverse to plaintiff on the
issue of the scope of his employment and should have
refused to allow any questions from his deposition relating to that issue. Appellant's brief quotes language
from Skornia v. Highway Pavers, Inc., 34 Wis. 2d 160;
148 N.W. 2d 678, which he urges supports that thesis.
The Skornia case in no way espouses the rule that
Appellant urges this court to adopt. In that case,
Skornia, a highway workman employee of a subcontractor, sued Allan Axt, a crane operator employee of
the general contractor together with his employer,
Highway Pavers, Inc., for injuries sustained on the
job. At the trial, Highway Pavers, Inc., claimed that
Allan Axt was not their employee but was, in fact,
doing work for the subcontractor employer of Skornia
at the time of the accident. The trial judge denied the
motion of Highway Pavers, Inc., to examine their codefendant, Allan Axt, as an adverse party and to
examine an employee of plaintiff's workman's compensation carrier (who was not a party) as an adverse
witness.
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The rule of this case is simply this: As to the
plaintiff' s workman's compensation carrier, a person,
though not a party to the action, nevertheless may be
called as an adverse witness by a defendant upon the
showing that the witness has a financial interest in the
outcome of plaintiff's case and an equal voice with
plaintiff in the prosecution of the case; and, as between
two co-defendants, wherein one of them seeks at the
trial to call the other as an adverse witness, he may
do so upon a showing that the financial interest of the
co-defendant is adverse to the party calling him, and
that the pleadings demonstrate that the witness claims
opposite to the party seeking to call him on the issue
upon which the examination is to be conducted. This
case in no way suggests that where a person is called
as an adverse witness by a party on the opposite side
of the lawsuit, the court can or ought to refuse to let
his deposition be introduced on the theory that his
interest may be adverse to a co-defendant in the action.
Again, in citing the opinion of Bauman v. Woodfield, 224 Md. 207, 223 A. 2d 364, Appellant seeks to
reach a different result than did the court by quoting
language of the opinion out of context. That case involved a Maryland statute similar to the Utah Rule
allowing the use of the deposition of an adverse party
for any purpose at the trial. Plaintiff appealed, claiming
the trial court erroneously allowed defendant to read
into evidence portions of plaintiff's pretrial deposition
but had refused to let plaintiff read the balance of the
deposition so as to complete the context. After the
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reading of the deposition, the court had allowed the
deponent plaintiff to testify extensively on the issues
covered by the deposition. After the language quoted
by Appellant's brief, the court emphasized that the
parties were in fact on opposite sides of the lawsuit,
being plaintiff and defendant respectively, and ruled
that the deposition of such an adverse party couid be
read at the trial, notwithstanding that the witness had
already testified in the course of the trial. The court
ruled that the words "any purpose" as used in the
statute do not mean that the use of the deposition is
limited to purposes of impeachment or contradiction,
but rather that the party may introduce the deposition
of his adversary as part of his substantive proof. The
ruling of that case is opposite to appellant's thesis and
nothing in the decision can in any way appropriately
be read to infer that when a plaintiff seeks a judgment
against a defendant and offers defendant's deposition
into evidence, the trial court should exclude the deposition testimony unless the defendant is opposite to
plaintiff in every issue of the pleadings.
Appellant's representation that Skok v. Glendale,
3 Ariz. App. 252, 413 P . 2d 585, supports his theory
is also unfounded. In that action, the city of Glendale, Arizona, brought suit against co-tenants of certain
real property for the costs of extension of sewer lines
and services to their real property. The case arose from
facts in which the city claimed that one William Barclay, one of the owners of the land, entered into a
contract with the city on behalf of himself and the other
28
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co-tenants obligating them all to pay for installation
of the sewer lines. The other co-tenant defendants
claimed Barclay had no authority to bind them by his
contract. Although Barclay had been among the original
defendants when the action commenced, by the time
of trial he had received a discharge in bankruptcy as
to the liability in question. The trial court, applying
a rule the same as our own, allowed the city to read
the deposition of Barclay into evidence on the theory
it was the deposition of an adverse party. The Arizona
Supreme Court ruled the trial court committed error
in allowing the deposition to be read into evidence
because at the time of trial Barclay was no longer a
"party" to the action and had no interest adverse to
the city by reason of his discharge in bankruptcy.
Regardless of how Appellant would like to stretch
the language of the opinion to say more than was decided
by the court, that case simply stands for the proposition
that a deponent, who was formerly a defendant in the
action but is no longer a party at the time of trial and
has no interst adverse to the plaintiff and whose deposition is offered into evidence, is not an adverse party
under Rule 32(a) (2).
In order to persuade this court that even though
the deposition of one adverse defendant may be admissable against himself, it should not be admissable
against his co-defendant, Appellant relies heavily upon
language found in two Michigan decisions. H e quotes
from the opinion in Ghezzi v. Holly (1970), 22 Michi29
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gan App. 157, 177 N.W. 2d 247, which in turn quotes
from Genesee Merchants Bank and Trust Company
v. Payne (1967), 6 Mich. App. 204, 148 N.W. 2d 503.
The Ghezzi case is clearly distinguishable from the case
before the court and the Genesee Merchants bank decision conforms to what was done by the trial court in this
action. The Ghezzi case involved a claim of malpractice.
The patient, Ghezzi, claimed Holly, a radiologist,
failed to notify him or his treating doctor that x-rays
showed a broken arm and so it was not immobilized
and he continued to use it extensively. Traumatic
arthritis developed. Ghezzi claimed Holly's failure to
communicate the x-ray results was the cause. The deposition of the treating physician, Dr. Mulder, was taken
in which in response to a hypothetical question, he testified it was his opinion that failure to immobilize a
non-displaced fracture could cause traumatic arthritis.
Although at the time of taking his deposition Dr.
Mulder was not a party to the action, he was thereafter
joined as a co-defendant because Holly claimed that
the x-ray results had been timely communicated to Dr.
Mulder's office. Plaintiff sought and received permission to join Dr. Mulder, alleging that if he had received
the results of the x-ray examination, then he was negligent in failing to treat the condition. At the trial
plaintiff sought to introduce Mulder's deposition as
expert opinion evidence against Holly on the question
of causation. That deposition contained the only testimony offered at the trial to substantiate the alleged
connection between a failure to immobilize plaintiff's
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arm and the arthritic condition subsequently found to
exist. After being joined as a defendant, Dr. Mulder
had, by his answer, and at the trial, denied any relationship between the alleged malpractice and the arthritic
condition. The deposition statement therefore constituted an admission by Dr. Mulder which was inconsistent with his position at trial.
The case is not controlling in our instant situation
not only because Dr. Mulder was not a party when
his deposition was taken but also because, as the court
noted in its opinion, the action really involved two lawsuits that were being tried together. The claimed
negligence of Holly was entirely independent of the
claim of negligence by Dr. Mulder and therefore the
expert opinion evidence on the question of causation
constituting an admission by Dr. Mulder would not,
under the rules of evidence, be admissable as an admission against Holly. The appellate court noted that
the plaintiff should not be permitted to discredit his
opponent's claims merely by joining as a co-defendant
any person from whom he could obtain a deposition
statement contrary to the position of the original defendant. There was no common interest as between
the defendants, Holly and Mulder. They operated their
businesses entirely independently. There was no claim
of an agency between them and the liability of each
of them would be independent of the question of liability
of the other. The distinguishing difference seems to be
the lack of common interest between Dr. Mulder and
Holly to form the basis to allow the admission of one
against the other.
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As previously stated, Appellants reliance on the
language contained in the Genesee Merchant's Bank
and Trust Company v. Payne is not well founded,
because the decision of that court supports what was
done in this action by the trial court. The case involved
a suit for injury consisting of a cut on the Achilles
tendon of a child, Mary Ann Blaisdell, while on the
premises of defendants, Carroll Payne and Margaret
Payne. The plaintiff bank, acting as guardian for the
minor child, brought the action on behalf of the child
claiming that the child's parents had left the child in
the care of Mr. and Mrs. Payne while they visited another child in the hospital. In the course of the afternoon, Mary Ann cut her Achilles tendon on some
object in Paynes' yard. Sometime after the injury,
a piece of glass (the top of a fruit jar) was discovered
in the vicinity of the injury. From a jury verdict in
favor of plaintiff, defendants appealed, asserting that
it was error for the trial court to allow introduction of
the discovery depositions of both defendants. After a
discussion of the plaintiff's use of the depositions of
both defendants as substantive proof in the action, the
court ruled as follows:
"Here, then, it was proper to admit the discovery
deposition of defendants, Carroll Payne and
Margaret Payne. These deponents were adverse
parties and their statements are no less admissable as depositions than if they had been made
under any other circumstances."
Again, Appellant's brief quotes language from
Glenn Falls Insurance Co. vs. Weiss, 150 N.Y.S. 2d
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685, 688 (1956), which he urges supports his theme.
That ease involved a claim against five defendants, some
corporate, some individuals, to set aside alleged f raududent conveyances of real estate. The court had before it a
motion to compel the taking of depositions of two of
the individual defendants who had previously failed
to appear for examination, allowing their defaults to
be entered.
The language quoted by Appellant is simply
dicta relating to what use might possibly be made of the
depositions at an eventual trial. The legal question
before the court was the issue of the sufficiency of the
notice and the court ruled that:
" . . . if a plaintiff desires to take the testimony
of one defendant as a witness against a co-defendant, the latter is 'entitled to plain notice to
that effect,' and the notice to take the deposition
of one defendant as a party is not sufficient."
The ruling of the court goes to the sufficiency of the
notice for the taking of the deposition and in no way
relates to the issue before this court.
Although the authorites cited by Appellant are
not in point, there is one case that has squarely met
the issues raised by Appellant. The decision was contrary to the position taken by the Appellant. In Snowhite v. State (1966) 243 Md. 291, 221 A. 2d 342, the
court dealt with a fact situation precisely on all fours
with the matter presently before this court. The action
involved a wrongful death claim brought by the widow
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and surviving child of Walter W . Tennon, who had
been killed in a traffic accident in a head-on collision
with a gasoline truck owned by Harold Snowhite and
driven by his employee-driver Clarence Henderson.
The employer, Snowhite, who operated a bulk oil and
gasoline business, claimed that he should not be held
liable for the negligent acts of Henderson because
Henderson had not taken the truck in the course of
his employment. I t appears that after having completed
some of his gasoline deliveries, Henderson had returned
the truck to the place he normally parked it. H e then
went to a bar where he drank almost a pint of whisky,
picked up a girl whom he then took in Snowhite's truck
to a place nearby for some "sporting." The accident
occurred when he was coming back to pick up a kerosene truck to make some other deliveries. During the
trial the trial court permitted the reading of portions
of Henderson's deposition as substantive evidence
against Snowhite on the issue of negligent entrustment
of the gasoline truck. The evidence related to Henderson being regularly allowed to use the trucks at his own
pleasure and for his own purposes. The court set forth
the issues to be decided as follows:
"Snowhite earnestly contends that the admission of a portion of Henderson's deposition as
substantive evidence against Snowhite on the
issue of negligent entrustment was both erroneous and prejudicial. On the question of admissibility, Snowhite's argument has three
prongs: (a) that the trial court misconstrued
Maryland Rule 413 which, when read in its
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entirety, does not permit the use of a party's
deposition when that party is present and available as a witness at the trial; (b) that although
Henderson and Snowhite were joined as co-defendants they did not share identity of interests
and the deposition of Henderson could not be
used against Snowhite on a separate and distinct
issue in the absence of such identity of interest;
and, (c) on the issue of negligent entrustment
Henderson was not an adverse party to the plaintiffs and his deposition is controlled for use at
the trial by Section (a) (3) of Maryland Rule
413/'
After quoting the Maryland Rule 413 which corresponds in all its applicable provisions with Utah Rule
32, the court observed that because the Maryland Rule
was so closely patterned after the Federal rule, the
court should appropriately look to federal decisions for
guidance. The court then goes on to rule as follows:
" . . . The federal cases have indicated that the
federal rule is to be interpreted literally and
means just what it says, i.e., that the deposition
of an adverse party may be used "for any purpose." The deposition or relevant parts thereof
of an adverse party may, therefore, be used as
substantive evidence against other adverse parties
even though that adverse party is present and
available for giving testimony. Its use is not
limited to impeachment of the testimony of the
adverse party, although it may be used for that
purpose too, if the adverse party testified. As
stated by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Pursche v. Atlas Scrapper & Engineering Co., 300 F2d 467, 488 (9th
Cir. 1962):
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'Atlas had taken Pursche's testimony pursuant
to Fed. Rules Civ. P r o a , Rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A.
in connection with its discovery and at the trial
offered the depositions en masse as original
evidence. But the court refused their admission.
I t does not appear that the depositions were
irregularly taken or that the court rejected
them because they were lengthy and no doubt
contained much that was repetitious, extraneous
or otherwise inadmissible. Rather, it appears
the court was of the opinion that since Pursche
was present Atlas was required to call him as a
witness and could not use his deposition to prove
any fact or facts therein stated. This conclusion
is manifest for in ruling, the court flatly said:
'You are not entitled to have the depositions
introduced if the witness is here except for impeaching purposes.' This was error. The use
of depositions is regulated by Rule 26(d); subsection one permits 'any party' to use a deposition to impeach the deponent as a witness, while
subsection three permits 'any party' to use the
deposition of any person as primary proof of
the facts stated there provided the deponent is
first shown to be unavailable as a witness; but
subsection two permits 'an adverse party' to use
the deposition of 'a party . . . for any purpose'
and imposes no preliminary conditions to this
use of the testimony. This is but a tacit way of
saying that the deposition can be used as original
evidence regardless of the presence or absence
of the deponent. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc.,
162 F . 2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Merchants Motor
Freight, Inc. v. Downing, 227 F . 2d 247 (8th
Cir. 1955); 4 Moore Fed. Prac. p. 1190.'
"See also Riley v. Layton, 329 F 2d 53, 58 (10th
Cir. 1964).
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"In our opinion, the trial court correctly interpreted Maryland Rule 413(a) to permit the use
of Henderson's deposition as substantive evidence even though Henderson was in court and
available as a witness.
"Although it is true that parties are not necessarily 'adverse' because they appear to be so by
their alignment in the pleadings, it seems clear
that the interest of the plaintiffs and Henderson
was adverse and the plaintiffs were 'adverse
parties' to Henderson within the meaning of
the Maryland Rule 413. As such they had the
right to introduce 'any part or all' of Henderson's deposition 'for any purpose.' There is no
limitation upon the use of the adverse party's
deposition other than that contained in Maryland Rule 413 (a) itself, i.e., that it may be used
only 'so far as admissible under the rules of evidence.' If Henderson had testified in person,
the substance of his testimony in the deposition
would have been admissible, and hence was admissible by use of his deposition under Maryland Rule 413(a). The weight of the testimony
as it might apply to a co-defendant with whom
there was no identity of interest on one of the
issues in the case would be for the jtiry." (pages
352 and 353)
The court in Snowhite v. State correctly applied
the rule, as did the trial court in this action, and its
reasoning should be followed by this court.
In Reilly v. Layton (1964) 329 F . 2d 53, a tenth
circuit court of appeals decision arising out of a medical
malpractice claim, the court was called upon to apply
Utah law in making a determination of whether or
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not the defendant's treatment of plaintiff's fractured
arm, which was ultimately amputated, in order to determine if expert testimony of a medical doctor met the
necessary qualifications as an expert witness. In the
course of the trial the judge had allowed plaintiff's
counsel to read from the deposition of one appellant,
Dr. Sanella, in cross-examining the other defendant,
Dr. Reilly. The appellant urged on appeal that since
the deposition had not been received into evidence, it
was prejudicial error to allow the deposition to be used
in cross examination in order to impeach Dr. Reilly.
The respondent asserted that the deposition had not
been used to impeach Dr. Reilly but rather that it was
used to test Dr. Reilly's knowledge of the existence
of the symptom of blueness in the patient's hand and
impairment of blood circulation in the arm that was
later amputated. In making its ruling on the issue,
the court stated as follows:
" . . . be that as it may, the deposition was that
of a party to the action, and under the express
terms of Rule 26 (d) (2), F.R. civ. P . 28 U.S.
C.A., the deposition of a party ' . . . may be used
by an adverse party for any purpose.' W e find
no error on this point."
In applying the California rule which contains
the same provisions as the Utah Rule, the Supreme
Court of California held in Mayhood v. LaRosa, 24
Cal Rptr. 837, 374 P . 2d 805, that the trial court
had erred in preventing defendant from introducing
into evidence plaintiff's deposition except for purposes
of impeachment, and stated:
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" . . . Section 2016 subdivision (d), paragraph
(2), provides that, 'so far as admissible under
the rules of evidence,7 any part or all of the
deposition of a party 'may be used by an adverse
party for any purpose/ Thus, insofar as plaintiff's deposition and answers to interrogatories
contained admissions, they should have been admitted in evidence. (Dini v. Dini, 188 Cal. App.
2d 506, 512 10 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574; Murry v.
Manley, 170 Cal. App. 2d 364, 367, 338, P . 2d
976, 978). As stated in the two cited cases, an
adverse party's deposition 'may be used to establish any material fact, a prima facie case, or
even to prove the whole case.' Consequently, a
party is not limited to using an adverse party's
deposition or answers to interrogatories for the
purpose of impeaching his testimony."
Wright and Miller, in their treatise, Federal Practice and Procedure, (1970) West Publishing, Vol 8,
Section 2145, made it clear that the Federal Rule 32
(a) (2) with which our rule corresponds has been
consistently applied to allow the deposition of a party
to freely be used by an adverse party literally for any
purpose, and Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. Downing, C.A. 8th, 1955, 227 F.2d 247, at page 250 makes
it clear that this rule is broad and is to be liberally construed. In Community Counseling Service, Incorporated v. Reilly, C.A. 4th, 1963, 317 F . 2d 239, at page
243 the court stated in reference to this rule:
" . . . It has been consistently held that the Rule
permits a party to introduce, as part of his substantive proof, the deposition of his adversary,
and it is quite immaterial that the adversary
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is available to testify at the trial or has testified
there . . . "
In 1969 the Sixth Circuit Court expressed approval
of that same rule in an action for personal injuries by
an injured customer and her husband against the
owners of two stores, where the owners of the first
store cross claimed against the second store in Pingatore v. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. F . W . Woolworth
Co., 419 F . 2d 1138. To that same effect, see Dexter
v. United States, D.C. Miss 1969, 306 F . Supp. 415,
425. In following the rule the Washington State Supreme Court stated:
" . . . The rule has been interpreted by the Federal Courts to permit the deposition of a party
to be used by an adverse party for any legal purpose/' Young v. Liddington, 50 Wash. 2d 78,
309 P . 2d 761.
Appellant contends that the trial court should not
have allowed the deposition testimony because it went
to the question of the scope of the employment of Craig
Kempton, and it would be no admission as against
Givan Ford. In so contending Appellant seems to
ignore the fact that Kempton was competent to testify
on the scope of his authority. It is a well settled rule
that at the* trial this fact of agency can be proven by
the testimony of the agent himself. That rule was
affirmed in Johnson v. Associated Seed Growers, 240
Wis. 278, 3 N.W. 2d 332, 324,
" . . . although the declarations of an agent
made to third persons, who are called to prove
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them, are, in general, no evidence of the existence of an agency, the authority of an agent,
when not in writing or so required to be, may
be proven by testimony given on the trial by the
agent himself."
The court, in Montgomery Production Cred. Assn.
v. Hohenburg & Co., 12 So. 2d 865, at 867 stated:
"Agency may be proved by the testimony of the
agent in the case in which the question of agency
arises."
And the California Court said in Boone v. Hall, 100
Cal. App. 2d 738, 224 P . 2d 881, 883:
"The fact of agency where it rests on parol may
be established at the trial by the testimony of
the agent himself."
See also, 3 American Jurisprudence 2nd, Agency, Section 354, Testimony of Agent.
As shown above, the trial court did not commit
reversible error in admission of evidence.

POINT II
T H E J U R Y V E R D I C T WAS A M P L Y SUPP O R T E D B Y T H E E V I D E N C E AS S H O W N
BY T H E RECORD.
In spite of Appellant's urging that the liability
of Givan Ford Sales, Inc., was not clearly shown, the
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record clearly demonstrates that Craig D. Kemp ton was
acting well within the scope of his employment at the
time of the accident. Respondent has referred extensively to the applicable facts in the record, both in the
statement of facts and the sixteen different items of
evidence enumerated under Point I above. That itemization was set forth in response to appellant's claim
that the only evidence of the liability of appellant came
out of the brief amount of testimony from the deposition, which was read to the witness and the jury. Respondent has also set forth in verbatim the total amount
of testimony that was read from the deposition.
As this court stated in Douglas v. Duvall, 5 Utah
2d 429, 304 P . 2d 373, after a jury trial this court is
not bound to accept Appellant's statement in its brief
of the facts most favorable to itself. In fact, on appeal
from a jury verdict, all evidence and inferences the
jury could reasonably draw therefrom are reviewed
in the light most favorable to the sustaining of the
verdict. Wardell v. Jarmon, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P .
2d 485; Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P. 2d
159. This court will assume the jury believed the evidence which supported their verdict. Hindmarsh v.
O. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P . 2d
410.
It is startling to have Appellant urge that a careful
examination of the record will reveal no substantial
evidence upon which the jury could have made a finding
of liability against Givan Ford Sales, Inc. It is interesting to note that Appellant introduced no evidence
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at the trial that Craig Kempton had ever been instructed
that he was not to take cars from the lot to warm them
up to check the antifreeze. The record is clear that he
was required to drain the radiators in the street where
it would drain into the gutter, and that he usually
drove them a few blocks to warm them up. It is also
clear that when he was hired, Ernie Earl told him to
"keep them running/' which he understood to include
frequent driving of the vehicles to inform his employer
of any problems relative to how they ran or their sales
condition. Furthermore, Appellant introduced no evidence to the efFect that Mr. Kempton was ever told
that he should not have driven the particular car involved in the accident, or that any supervisor at any
time, even after the accident, expressed any objection
to his having taken the car to that intersection.
Ernie Earl testified that when he hired Craig and
gave him instructions as to his duties, he told Craig,
among other things, that he was to keep the cars running (Tr. 219), and that after two or three days he
would be on his own without someone showing him
what to do (Tr. 222). The record is clear that Mr.
Kempton was free to drive the cars on and off the lot
throughout the day, as he serviced them, moved them
about, warmed them up, and otherwise checked them to
keep them in sales condition. His driving the Sunbeam
Alpine to that intersection, three blocks away from the
lot the morning of the accident in order to warm it
up to check the antifreeze was consistent with his usual
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praotice when checking antifreeze, and was cltearly
within the scope and course of his employment.
Appellant quotes from Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah
65, 102 P . 2d 493 (1940), asserting it is practically
indistinguishable on its facts from the present case.
Such an assertion is clearly erroneous. In that case
plaintiiF attempted to rely on a presumption derived
from evidence that the employer was the owner of the
truck which displayed his name as the only basis for
his argument that the judge should have submitted the
question of agency to the jury for its determination.
The action involved a collision by a grocery delivery
truck driven by an employee of the defendant. The
employee regularly made six delivery trips a day following a route prepared by the manager on each trip.
On the day in question, he had made his deliveries and
was to return to the store, but he gave two girls a ride
well beyond the employer's store and ten blocks away
from his route. H e had instructions that he should not
take passengers without permission. There was no passenger seat in the truck, and the girls sat on an empty
packing box. The trial court decided that the driver
was acting outside the scope of his employment "on a
frolic of his own," as a matter of law, and directed the
jury to return a verdict of no cause of action against
the employer. As stated by the Supreme Court:
"The question involved in this appeal is whether
the presumption that the agent was acting
within the scope of his employment arising from
proof of ownership of the car and agency, and
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the affirmative evidence rebutting this presumption, raise a question of law for the court to decide, or a question of fact to be submitted to the
jury." (page 68)
As noted by the court, when plaintiff introduced no
evidence in support of his theory that the employee
acted within the scope of his employment other than
the presumption of mere ownership of the automobile:
" . . . the evidence offered in rebuttal of the
presumption of the agency of the driver from
proof of ownership may be so uncontradicted
and conclusive as to entitle the court to say as
a matter of law, that the presumption has been
rebutted." (page 70)
The court further stated:
"In the present case plaintiff did not offer any
evidence contradicting that offered by the dedefndant to rebut the presumption. So the court
properly did not submit the case to the jury."
The Saltas case stands only for the proposition
that where plaintiff relies on a presumption arising
from proof of ownership of a car and agency, and
presents no further evidence in support of his theory
that the employee acted within the scope of his agency,
affirmative evidence rebutting that presumption, if uncontradicted, can be sufficient for the court to determine the question as a matter of law.
The rule of the Saltas case is clearly not applicable
in our instant case. Plaintiff, Coburn, did not rely
exclusively upon a presumption arising out of owner-
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ship of the vehicle, but presented other extensive and
substantial evidence showing Craig Kempton was acting
within the scope of his authority.
Finally, as stated by Justice MacDonaugh in
Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P . 2d 664:
"Where the parties have been afforded a trial, a
presumption arises that the judgment should
not be disturbed unless the one attacking it
meets the burden of showing error substantial
and prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been
different in the absence of such error." (page
167)

CONCLUSION
The jury verdict in this case was appropriate. The
facts and evidence support the judgment and counsel
for plaintiff respectfully submits that the defendant
has failed to show any prejudicial error or any reasonable likelihood that the result would be different if
defendant were awarded a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
A. D E A N J E F F S of J E F F S A N D J E F F S
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
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